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This article analyzes both the monetary and non-monetary effects of the 
education level of the head of the household on poverty. We propose that 
schooling returns should not be thought as a single number - usually the
schooling coeffi cient in an income equation - but as a set of elements whose 
length depends on the number of identifi ed poverty dimensions. The monetary 
analysis employs the Quantile Regression technique, very helpful especially
when one is interested in extremes of the income distribution function. Our 
results show differences across quantiles of the returns. We also found in-
teresting dissimilarities by gender and urban-rural location. Exploring the
non-pecuniary returns, we found that the education of the head positively 
infl uences family health and housing conditions.
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Canales de impacto de la educa-
cin en la pobreza
En este artículo se analizan los efectos 
monetarios y no monetarios que tiene 
en la pobreza el nivel de educación
del jefe de familia. Se plantea que los 
retornos a la educación no deben ser
vistos como una cifra–generalmente
un coefi ciente de educación en una
ecuación para el cálculo de los ingre-
sos–sino como una serie de elementos 
cuya duración depende del número de 
aspectos identifi cados de la pobreza.
Se utilizó la técnica de regresión 
por cuantiles, la cual es útil cuando
se está interesado en los extremos 
de la función de distribución de in-
gresos.  Los resultados demuestran
diferencias entre los cuantiles de los
retornos. Se encontraron diferencias
interesantes por género y ubicación
rural/urbana. Una exploración de los 
retornos no pecuniarios reveló que la 
educación del jefe de familia infl uye 
positivamente en las condiciones de
salud y vivienda de la familia. 
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Differentes canais de impacto da
educação na pobreza
O artigo analisa os efeitos monetá-
rios e os não-monetários do nível de
escolaridade do chefe de família na
situação de pobreza. Propomos que o
rendimento da escolaridade não seja
pensado como um simples número–
usualmente o coefi ciente de escolari-
dade em uma equação da renda–mas
como um conjunto de elementos cuja
extensão depende da quantidade de
dimensões de pobreza identifi cadas. 
A análise monetária usa a técnica 
de Regressão Quantil, muito útil
especialmente quando estamos in-
teressados nos extremos da função 
de distribuição das rendas. Nossos 
resultados mostram diferenças entre 
os quantis dos retornos. Também 
encontrámos interessantes desigual-
dades conforme o sexo e a localização
urbana-rural. Explorando os retornos
não pecuniários, descobrimos que a 
educação do chefe de família infl uen-
cia positivamente a saúde familiar e
as condições de habitação. 
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Retornos da educação, pobreza, re-
gressão quantil.
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The academic discussion about the 
benefi ts of schooling in increasing 
the welfare of individuals is very ex-
tensive and methodologically diverse.
Researchers have emphasized the im-
portance of education to: i) increase 
the ability of individuals to acquire
higher income, and ii) positively in-
fl uence several social and economic 
outcomes that improve people’s
wellbeing, this is, returns to educa-
tion have multiple dimensions. For 
instance, Haveman and Wolfe (1984) 
present an enriched list containing 
different impact channels of schooling 
including private and public effects, 
marketed and non marketed returns 
such us intra-family productivity, 
child quality - level of education and 
cognitive development of children-, 
family health, fertility, crime reduc-
tion, social cohesion, savings, income 
distribution, among other 20 chan-
nels of impact.
The need to privilege a multidimen-
sional approach when measuring 
returns to education is aligned with 
the tendency in the literature to 
measure poverty and inequality in
a multidimensional framework. Ac-
cording to this approach, income is 
only one of the multiple dimensions 
where an individual or household
may experience poverty conditions 
(Sen, 1985) and only one of the 
several attributes on which it is 
interesting to analyze inequality. 
Indeed, authors like Atkinson and 
Bourguignon (1982), Bourguignon 
and Chakravarty (2003), Tsui (1994, 
2002), among others, have focused
their contributions in providing an 
appropriate methodology for the 
estimation of aggregate multidimen-
sional poverty indices. Bourguignon 
and Chakravarty, for instance,
suggest to specify a poverty line for
each dimension; someone would be 
considered as poor if he falls below
at least one of the defi ned poverty
lines (union approach). The authors
combine the different poverty lines
and the corresponding gaps - differ-
ence between the observed outcome
and the specifi ed poverty threshold -, 
the result being a multidimensional 
measure of poverty.
Apart from the multidimensional
nature of the educational returns, 
another relevant aspect when analyz-
ing the benefi ts of schooling is that 
those returns may differ according
to the type of individuals that are
improving their human capital. This
is, monetary and non-monetary re-
turns to education are heterogeneous
among groups, and it is interesting to 
explore such differences in order to 
more effi ciently design educational 
policies as antipoverty policies.
This empirical article aims at esti-
mating, using Colombian data, the 
returns to education related to various 
poverty dimensions and correspond-
ing to different groups of individuals,
differentiated essentially by gender, 
income quintile and rural-urban 
location. We propose that, when 
analyzing education as an antipoverty 
policy, schooling returns should not 
be thought as a single number (usu-
ally the coeffi cient of schooling in an 
income or earnings equation) but as a
set of elements whose length depends
on the number of identifi ed poverty 
dimensions. This is,
Ai = [Ai1,Ai2, ... ,Ain] (1)
Where αij corresponds to the return
to education in terms of dimension
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j=1, 2…n for the group of individuals
(e.g men, women, poorest quintile 
of income distribution, etc). This 
method of estimating returns is use-
ful to compare the relative impact
of education on different vulnerable
groups, say, women, inhabitants of 
rural areas, people from poor neigh-
borhoods, among others. It also al-
lows us to detect possible obstacles 
for certain educated groups to realize 
the benefi ts of education; for instance,
comparing returns of women and 
men, one might fi nd signals of fail-
ures in the economic environment 
that hinder women to enjoy their
improved schooling level. We will see 
that our results do not validate this
potential failure. Another reason why 
this presentation of the returns is
useful is that we may identify certain 
type of individuals that are a better 
target for educational policies, since
they obtain higher returns related 
to a given poverty dimension (for
instance, women head of households
and family health).
Even if it may seem restrictive, for
this research we have chosen to use
the information corresponding to the 
heads of households, because educa-
tion of the heads plays a decisive
role in shaping the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household as a 
whole, hence, its poverty conditions.
However, this means that we should
be careful with the interpretation 
of our results, for instance when 
analyzing educational returns for 
female heads, since women´s head-
ship is not a random or exogenous
characteristic.
We are interested in exploring the 
different channels through which 
the level of education of the ‘head’
impacts the poverty level of the 
household they lead. We identify both
monetary and non-monetary returns
to education, which corresponds, 
respectively, to the effect of school-
ing on the income poverty dimen-
sion and its effect on other poverty
dimensions like health and housing.
When estimating the non-pecuniary
returns, one of our main interests is 
to distinguish the impact of education
and that of income on the specifi c 
outcome.
The pecuniary analysis employs the 
quantile regression technique (Koen-
ker, 2005; Koenker and Bassett,
1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
This methodology is very helpful 
especially when one is interested 
in the lowest or highest extremes of 
the distribution function of the de-
pendent variable. In fact, there is no
reason to believe that the estimates 
of the effects of education on the in-
come of households or individuals do
not vary between the lowest and the
upper tail of the income distribution. 
By using the traditional Least Square 
estimation, we would obtain only the
effect of education on the conditional
mean of the response variable. In 
contrast, quantile regression offers
coeffi cient estimations for any con-
ditional quantile.
Besides, given that education is an 
endogenous variable in the equation
explaining the income level of the 
household, we use an instrumental
variable quantile regression tech-
nique recently popularized by Cher-
nozhukov and Hansen (2001, 2004,
2005) among others. Interesting 
fi ndings are obtained when making 
the analysis by gender and (urban-
rural) sector.
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This article is organized as follows. 
The second section presents a short 
review of some contributions to the 
theory on educational returns that
were relevant for this document. 
Besides, the methodology used to 
estimate the model is explained.
In the third section, we explain the 
data and show some descriptive sta-
tistics of the variables. In the fourth 
and fi fth sections we present the es-
timations of both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary educational returns using 
Colombian data. The results of the in-
strumental variable quantile regres-
sion confi rm the heterogeneity of the 
effect of education across quantiles 
of the conditional household-income
distribution, specifi cally comparing 
the extremes of the income distribu-
tion. Moreover, the estimates refl ect 
the relevance of the non-pecuniary 
effects, and confi rm that an analysis 
based only on monetary outcomes is 
incomplete. Finally we present the 
conclusions.
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Let us start with the monetary ef-
fect of education on poverty, i.e. the 
income return to education. In the 
human capital literature, whose pio-
neers are Schultz (1961) and Becker 
(1965), education is seen as an in-
vestment of present resources (time 
opportunity cost and direct costs)
in order to obtain future returns. 
Schultz argued that knowledge and 
skills are a form of capital, which 
is a result of deliberate investment. 
Education, training, and health in-
vestment increase opportunities and 
choices available to individuals, by
affecting the ability to do productive
work. Schultz attributes the differ-
ence in earnings between people to 
the differences in access to education 
and health.
As for Becker (1965), he assumes that 
individuals choose education to maxi-
mize the present value of expected 
future incomes before retirement, 
net of the costs of education. Invest-
ing in education entails explicit costs
(i.e. fee, books, transport, etc.) and
implicit costs, corresponding to the
opportunity cost of spending money
and time on education instead of 
working to increase current income
and production. The return of the 
nth year of education can be seen as
the difference between the wage ob-
tained with n years of schooling and 
the wage obtained with n-1 years of 
schooling. Based on this assessment,
several estimations of schooling
returns for different countries have 
been carried out by analyzing the 
variation of wages with an additional 
year of schooling.
An important extension of the human
capital theory is made by Mincer
(1974), which has been the bench-
mark for a great number of em-
pirical work on labor economics and 
economics of education. Based on
empirical and theoretical arguments, 
the Mincer equation expresses earn-
ings as a function of schooling and 
experience. The simplest version of 
the Mincerean wage equation was 
followed by a number of extensions, 
among others by Hungerford and So-
lon (1987), whose main contribution
was to highlight the non-linearity
of the relationship between years of 
schooling and income described in 
the Mincer equation. Indeed, there
exist the so-called ` sheepskin effects’, 
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which refl ect higher increments in 
wage in those years of schooling 
that represent the culmination of an
educational level (i.e. secondary or
higher).
In this article, we want to explore the 
effect of schooling level of the head of 
the household Shh in total household
income Yh. The problem of endogene-
ity of the schooling variable should be 
solved in order to obtain consistent
estimators. We then estimate,
Shh = Z´hh +X´hh    + E  (First stage) (2)
lnYhh =A Shh +X´hh + E (Second stage)
Where we expect  to be exogenous, 
Z is a vector of instrumental vari-
ables related to and unrelated to
income, and Xhh is a vector including
other variables affecting household 
income. The idea is to identify exog-
enous infl uences on schooling deci-
sions. Harmon and Walker (1995) 
exploit the exogenous changes in the
distribution of education of individu-
als due to the increase of the mini-
mum school-leaving age. Angrist and 
Krueger (1991) employ the season of 
birth of individuals to provide instru-
ments for schooling. They consider
the fact that those students born at
the beginning of the year start edu-
cation at an older age than students 
born at the end of the year. Therefore, 
the fi rst group reaches school-leav-
ing age earlier and may drop out 
after completing less schooling than
individuals from the second group. 
Another example is Card (1993), who 
employs data on proximity to schools
considering that individuals living
close to an educational institution
are more likely to attend school than 
those living far away.
In line with Harmon and Walker 
(1995), we have explored exogenous
variations on the schooling atten-
dance of individuals in Colombia. Our
instrument refl ects the great educa-
tional expansion that Colombia expe-
rienced since the middle of the fi fties. 
Due to the governmental purpose to
universalize primary education, the
years of schooling of that cohort of 
individuals and the next cohorts in-
crease signifi cantly compared to ear-
lier cohorts. This will be equivalent 
to considering a change in minimum 
school-leaving age to be equal to 12 
years. Explicitly, the instrument is 
a dummy taking the value of 0 for 
people born before 1951 and equal to
1 for those born from that year on.
Graph 1 shows the average schooling
across cohorts, which is motivating
the choice of the instrument.
The analysis of the impact of educa-
tion on income offers more interest-
ing insights if we can identify this
infl uence on different quantiles of 
our response variable distribution 
- household income -. For such a 
purpose, a conventional Least Square 
regression is not helpful, since it only 
captures the relationship between co-
variates and the conditional mean of 
the dependent variable. In contrast,
Quantile Regression, an alternative 
econometric method introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978), captures 
the relationship between the covari-
ates and any conditional quantile of 
the response variable. In our case, 
for instance, the method allows us to
concentrate attention on the lowest
income groups.
Following Koenker (2005), we have
that, for a random variable Y with
probability distribution function 
(3)
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F(Y) = Pr (Y ≤ y) the τth quantile of 
Y is,
F-1(T) = Q(T) = inf {y: F(y) ≥T}         (4)
Thus, the median of a distribution
corresponds to Q(0,5).
Recall that, for a random sample of Y ,
the sample median minimizes the sum 
of absolute deviations or residuals
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The traditional OLS method provides 
an estimate of β which expresses the
relationship between X and the con-
ditional mean of Y. In contrast, the
use of quantile estimations allows 
us to obtain β(τ) for any quantile τ ∈
(0,1), this is, the relationship between 
X and any quantile of the distribu-
tion of Y.
Now, when we have to deal with 
an endogeneity problem, the right 
method to estimate the model is 
an Instrumental Variable Quantile 
2
4
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Source: Calculations based on Quality of Life Survey - DANE.
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Regression. Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2001, 2004, 2005) deal with 
this issue. They worked out a model
of quantile treatment effect - QTE
- under endogeneity and obtain con-
ditions for identifi cation of the QTE 
without functional form assumptions. 
This technique is known as Instru-
mental Variable Model of Treatment
Effect, which modifi es the estimation
procedure of the quantile regression
by introducing instrumental vari-
ables that correct for the endogene-
ity problem and allow us to obtain 
consistent estimators.
Based on Chernozhukov and Han-
sen’s methodology, in the next section
we estimate the coeffi cients of the
schooling variable by income quintile, 
which allows us to distinguish the ef-
fect of education among the poorest
groups respect to the richest. The es-
timated conditional quantile models 
can be expressed as follows:
)(')()(ln TBTAT XSQ hhXYh   (7)
Where X is a vector of independent 
variables. As mentioned, an instru-
ment for education reflecting a
change in schooling leaving age is
used.
Let us now focus on the non pecuniary
effects of schooling. Certain decisions
and the behavior of individuals might
be favorably changed as education
increases, allowing people to avoid 
or escape from poverty. Specifi cally, 
a higher capability to make more con-
venient - crucial - decisions increases 
the probability of success in reaching 
basic needs.
In the literature of the economics of 
education, there are important con-
tributions on the non-market benefi ts 
of schooling such as Becker (1965), 
Michael (1972), Grossman (2005), 
and Haveman and Wolfe (1984), al-
ready mentioned in the introduction.
The main idea of these contributions
is that education positively infl uences 
the effi ciency of non-market sector 
production processes (household 
production): consumers produce 
commodities using inputs and time,
and education reduces the absolute
and relative marginal costs of home
produced commodities. It also infl u-
ences certain decisions of individuals 
such as growth in consumption (sav-
ings) during the life cycle, quantity
and quality of children, addiction to
drugs, etc.
Grossman (2005) emphasizes the in-
fl uence of education on the increase
of both, production effi ciency and al-
locative effi ciency. To illustrate the 
fi rst aspect, production effi ciency, he 
uses the example of health, and con-
cludes that an increase in schooling 
is predicted to increase the quantity
of health demanded but to lower the
quantity of medical care demanded.
Intuitively, a combination of good 
habits and a greater valuation of 
health as one of the most important 
source of human capital, leads to this 
result. As for effi ciency in allocation,
more educated people are able to pick 
a better combination of inputs that
gives them more quantity of output.
The focus in this article will be on 
the non- market benefi ts of education 
that are related to poverty, specifi cal-
ly, those educational impacts on basic 
needs. With this purpose, we will use
reduced forms of a household produc-
tion function of basic commodities
that enter a utility function. Becker 
(1965) claimed that households, as
utility maximizers, combine market
%345$)/3'%2%.#)!,%3
goods (x) and time (T) to produce such 
commodities (j),
),( jjjj Txfz 
In our context, education is thought
as an input entering the production 
functions of all the commodities that 
we are interested in analyzing. More 
specifi cally, z will represent health 
conditions, affi liation to the health 
system, and housing conditions.
There are several reasons to support 
reduced forms of (8) related to basic
needs. Education enhances the abil-
ity to receive adequate nourishment:
a well-educated person is more likely
to select the right food needed to at-
tain proper levels of nutrition, even 
with little money. Likewise, a person
with higher education is better in-
formed and therefore has the option 
to adopt good habits that allow him 
to have a healthier life. Knowledge of 
the human body, and its functioning, 
allows the person - if he wants - to 
take better care of it (Kenkel, 1991;
Strauss, 1990).
A similar correlation with education 
applies to the capability to avoid 
premature mortality. In addition,
the capability of family planning 
has an obvious link with education, 
as familiarity with the reproductive 
system and contraceptive methods
may help people to prevent unex-
pected pregnancies (Michael and 
Willis, 1976). There is an impact on 
the desired number of children as 
well, for at least two reasons: higher 
opportunity cost of having children 
(forgone income for raising children 
is higher for an educated person) and
preference for postponing the age to 
start breeding (while educational 
investment is taking place).
The results for the non-monetary ef-
fects of education that are shown in
the next section come from an equa-
tion of the form:
UFGBA  hhhhh XYSz 'ln   (9)
Where the response variable zh cor-
responds to health and housing out-
comes. On the RHS we have schooling
of the head (Shh), household income 
(lnYh), and other characteristics of the 
households and the head (vector X).
We are interested in distinguishing 
the impact of education and that of 
income: differences in households’ out-
comes are not exclusively explained by 
differences in income, but also by the 
schooling level of the head.
The Hausmann test revealed that
both schooling and income are en-
dogenous variables, hence, the error
term is v = v + ε, i.e. the sum of an
exogenous component and a compo-
nent of unobserved factors related to
the endogenous variables. Thus, we
instrumented S by using, as before,
a dummy refl ecting changes in the
school leaving age. In addition, we
instrumented the variable income
by using the regional unemployment
rate, as suggested by Ettner (1996).
Ettner claims that, in spite of the
concern that the instrument may be
correlated with health (high unem-
ployment rates may be detrimental to
mental health), the Wald tests do not
provide consistent evidence to doubt 
the suitability of unemployment rate 
as an instrument - the variable sat-
isfi es the exclusion restriction-. Our
own tests statistically justify the use
of this variable as an instrument.
Before going to the results, it is 
worthy to notice that income gains 
of schooling are obtained only when
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agents have fi nished school and enter 
the labor market, while the non-
monetary gains might be perceived 
even before the schooling investment 
period has culminated.
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We will employ micro-data from a
Colombian database called “Quality
of Life Survey”. The sample design 
of the survey allows researchers to
analyze the data at national level 
and by regions. The National Depart-
ment of Statistics (DANE) carried out
this survey in 1997 and 2003. The
pooled cross section data contains 
information for 31.745 households.
The survey inquires about housing 
conditions, access and quality of wa-
ter, characteristics and composition
of the household, health, character-
istics of children less than 5 years 
old, education (to members fi ve years 
old or more), employment, life condi-
tions of the household, and household 
spending.
Table 1 summarizes the variables
included in the estimated models. 
In the income equation, instead of 
the usual quadratic age variable, 
a quartic expression is considered.
This is in line with the fi ndings of 
Lemieux (2006), who argues that a
quartic function better refl ects the
income - experience profi le. In order 
to remove from the income returns
any assortative mating effect of 
education, we control by including 
the schooling of the spouse in the
income equation. Moreover, we also
remove from the estimated returns
the effect of education on family size,
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by including the variable dependency
rate. Finally, as we are working with
pooled cross section data, there is a 
dummy equal to zero if the informa-
tion corresponds to 1997 and equal to 
1 if it corresponds to 2003.
As for the non-pecuniary returns
estimations, we use three dependent 
variables: percentage of affi liation to 
the health system, average health
conditions of the household, and an 
index of housing conditions. The fi rst 
health indicator corresponds to a 
simple rate between family members
affi liated to the health system over
the total family members. The second 
health indicator is obtained as fol-
lows: each member of the household 
has a given level of health condi-
tions, labeled numerically from bad 
to excellent. The individual health
conditions are averaged by household 
to obtain our dependent variable.
These variables transformations are 
justifi ed if we wanted to continue the 
analysis at the household level as in 
the previous section.
The housing conditions index is based 
on information about access and qual-
ity of utilities, material of walls and 
fl oor. For each variable involved we 
have three categories: bad/fair/good 
(never/sometimes/always in the case
of access to utilities). We gave them 
numbers from 1 to 3, and add them
up to obtain a single housing index.
Thus, it is assumed that all the differ-
ent attributes are equally important 
to defi ne the index. As this method 
looks quite ad hoc, a principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) was used to
check if results would differ.
Table 2 shows some descriptive sta-
tistics of the data. The information
shows a clear disadvantaged of the 
rural sector in all indicators: school-
ing of both heads of households and
their spouses are lower than for any
other group, as well as the average
income, while the dependency rate
is the highest. As for gender, income 
is slightly lower for women. There is
no important difference in schooling
years for male and female heads, but
it is noticeable the difference in years
of education among their wives and 
husbands.
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3.1. Results of the Instrumental 
Variable Quantile Regression
The income equation estimated here
includes the following control vari-
Table 2. Some descriptive Statistics
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ables: head schooling (instrumented), 
spouse schooling, age of the head, a 
polynomial of age, gender of the head, 
urban-rural location of the household, 
dependency rate and a dummy indi-
cating the year of the data. In the 
schooling equation or reduced equa-
tion, the instrument is signifi cant 
and, as expected, has positive sign
(see table A1 in the appendix).
By using the Two- stage Least Square 
method we fi nd that an additional 
year of schooling of the head of the 
household increases total income of 
the household by around 8,7% (see 
Table A1 in the appendix for the 
complete results).
There are interesting results when 
doing the regressions by quantiles:2
the schooling coeffi cient decreases as
quantile increases. The educational
return for the lowest quintile doubles 
the return corresponding to the high-
est quintile (see Graph 2).
How can be explained this decreasing 
tendency? the results suggest that 
people from lower quantiles profi t 
more from each additional year of 
schooling than those belonging to
the right extreme of income distribu-
tion. We may suggest that there are
certain factors that increase with 
the income quintile such as quality
of social networks, more favorable 
2 The results for the quantile regression, no instrumenting schooling, are shown in table A2 in the appendix. 
Our models were estimated by using the Matlab code developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2001, 
2004, 2005), available on the webpage http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.hansen/research/index.
htm
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family environment, motivation, 
among others. This means that, at a 
given schooling level, richer people
have more chances to get better jobs 
than poorer people, due to wider con-
nections and more people belonging 
to their social network that occupy
high quality jobs. These factors cause 
that people from higher quantiles 
obtain higher earnings independently
of their schooling level, while the 
marginal benefi t of educational in-
vestment for the poorest is greater. 
Having this is mind, it makes sense 
that the schooling coeffi cient for the 
lowest quintiles doubles the coeffi -
cient for the highest quintile.
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), 
provide an alternative explana-
tion to the decreasing coeffi cient as 
quantile increases. They consider 
the quintile to which an individual 
belong as a proxy of his `unobserved’ 
ability: “people with high unobserved
‘ability’, as measured by the quantile
index τ will generate high earnings
regardless of their education level, 
while those with lower ‘ability’ gain
more from the training provided by 
formal education” (p. 21). The prob-
lem of Chernozhukov and Hansen’s
explanation is that it implies that
ability and education are substitutes 
in the production of income, while it is 
more sensible to think that these at-
tributes are complements: schooling
fosters ability, at least when educa-
tion is of reasonable quality.
The results of the other variables can
be interpreted as follows (Table 3).
Table 3. Results of the instrumental variable quantile regression
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• The coeffi cient for spouse school-
ing is positive and signifi cant for 
all quintiles - it slightly increases
with the quantile -. It is observed 
that the gap between the coeffi -
cient for the head’s schooling and 
the spouse’s schooling is higher 
for the lowest quintiles: for the 
richest groups, the schooling of the 
spouse is almost as important as
the head schooling in determining 
the income of the household, while 
for the poorer groups, schooling of 
the head is more decisive.
• The coeffi cient of the gender of the
head is only signifi cant for the low-
est quantile, showing a marked 
disadvantaged of the poorest 
female headed households. For 
the other quantiles, the gender 
does not seem to be an impor-
tant determinant of the income. 
This result is different when the 
variable spouse schooling is not 
included in the income equation. 
Table A1 in the appendix shows
that, in this case, the coeffi cient of 
gender is signifi cant and refl ects
a disadvantaged for the female
headed households.
• Households living in urban areas
tend to have more income than in
rural areas. The result is consis-
tent with the poverty measures 
for Colombia, according to which
the inhabitants of rural areas are 
significantly poorer than those
in urban areas: 68% of the rural
population is poor, compared to
47% in urban areas.
• The coeffi cient corresponding to 
the variable ‘dependency rate’ 
is negative except for the lowest
quantile. It makes a lot of sense
that the sign of the coefficient 
for the poorest groups is positive, 
since children belonging to them 
start participating in the labor 
market at a shorter age. However, 
the coeffi cient is not signifi cant for 
this quintile. We will see that, in
the rural areas, the coeffi cient is
signifi cant and positive.
3.2. Household income by gen-
der of the head
There are some interesting fi ndings 
from the analysis by gender of the 
head and urban-rural location of the 
household3 (Tables A3 and A4 in the 
appendix).
Perhaps the most interesting one is 
that the schooling coeffi cient corre-
sponding to women at rural areas is 
the highest compared to the coeffi cient 
of any other group (Graph 3). On the
contrary, the coeffi cient for men at 
rural areas resulted non signifi cant.
There are two possible factors explain-
ing this result. First, around 25% of 
male heads at rural areas work as
farm-laborers, where physical abilities
are more important than intellectual 
abilities; this proportion is 5,7% for
women. Besides, only 2,3% of male
heads are public servants compared to 
8,3% of female heads (for the highest
quantiles these proportions are 7% 
and 26% respectively). This job posi-
tion does positively reward education. 
3 Let us recall that these results correspond to the returns to education for heads of households. The co-
effi cient would most probably differ if we had used a broader sample, since, for instance, being a woman 
head of household is not a random characteristic.
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Second, education of female heads 
might have a higher multiplicative 
effect towards the rest of the family
because women spend more time with
their children than do men (Coleman 
and Ganong, 2003). Thus, an edu-
cated mother plays a more important
role in determining household income
than an educated father.
The result for rural female head of 
households may have important im-
plications when designing rural edu-
cational policies. In Colombia, only
the 28% of people (men and women)
at schooling age in rural areas has
access to media education (two last
years of secondary school). According 
to the Ministry of education, there 
have been important achievements
in the rural sector during the last
decades related to the coverage rate 
at basic education, which is currently 
higher to 90%. However, there are 
little options for young people to con-
tinue studying after basic education
due to the necessity of contributing
to the household income. There are 
studies revealing that education of 
the mother is more important than 
education of the father in determin-
ing children schooling achievements: 
a survey conducted in 2008 by the
National Council for Educational 
Research and Training said that the 
learning capability of children in-
creased by 9% to 13% (7% to 11%) as
the mother’s (father’s) schooling level
increased from illiterate to gradua-
tion. Hence, educating female heads
at rural areas brings high returns,
both private and social.
Comparing the schooling coeffi cient
by gender in urban areas and for the
complete sample, we observe that
education of the head has a higher
impact on the income level of female-
headed households. The result is 
similar to what has been found by
other researchers - not for head of 
households but the total population 
- as Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
(2004) on the wage return to school-
ing, according to which men´s return
equals 8,7 while women´s equals 9,8.
Again, one source of explanation for
our result is the higher multiplicative
effect of the female heads schooling,
given the bigger amount of time that 
mothers spend with their children
compared to fathers. Thus, the school-
ing spillovers should be also higher.
Another interesting result is the coef-
fi cient of the variable dependency rate
in the case of rural female headed
households: it shows a positive rela-
tionship between family income and 
dependency rate, while the coeffi cient
is negative for urban areas and the 
total of households (non-signifi cant 
in the case of rural male heads). This
might be a refl ect of the higher par-
ticipation of youngsters in the labor
market to support a mother head of 
household in rural areas.
3.3. Non-Monetary schooling 
returns
3.3.1. Education and health
We consider here two indicators of 
health:4percentage of members of 
the household affi liated to the health 
4 In Colombia, the health system has two different regimes: contributive and subsidized. The fi rst one is 
jointly paid by workers (1/3) and employers (2/3), or by independent workers. An affi liated worker can
enroll his/her children and partner. The second system is directed to people with no capacity to pay. 
The total coverage is only 74% (33.7% contributive and 40.4% subsidized). There are public and private 
suppliers of both regimes.
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system and average health conditions
of the members of the household.
Table 4 shows the results of the re-
gressions.
All the covariates are signifi cant to 
explain the percentage of affi liation 
to the health insurance system. Ad-
ditional years of schooling positively 
infl uence the probability of affi liation. 
The sources of this effect are that
more education enlarges the possibili-
ties for an individual to get a formal 
job, which facilitates his own affi lia-
tion and the affi liation of his family
to the health system. In Colombia, 
having access to the health services is 
necessarily linked to the labour mar-
ket: employees, employers, self-em-
ployed, and their dependents. Being 
health a fundamental human right,
it is unavoidable to criticize this sys-
tem in an economy with such a high
levels of unemployment (12,2%, 
DANE, 2009). Although Colombia 
has a subsidized health regime, the 
coverage of this is far from universal, 
and the quality of the service is still 
an urgent issue to be tackled.
As for family health conditions,
Schooling level of the head is relevant
in determining family health because 
education may help to improve hab-
its of nutrition, smoking, alcohol 
consumption, sports practice, among
others.5
His own health is positively impacted
since a better educated person has 
higher chances of choosing an oc-
cupation with lower risks; besides, 
because of his better possibilities of 
getting higher earnings, he may have 
the option to choose a better location 
for living. The poorest neighborhoods 
in developing countries have serious
problems of public health due mainly 
to dusted streets and non treated 
sewage waters, which obviously affect 
individuals’ health. Grossman (2005)
claims that schooling is the most 
important correlate of good health,
making stronger his point noticing 
that “this fi nding emerges whether
health levels are measured by mortal-
ity rates, morbidity rates, self-evalua-
tion of health status, or physiological 
indicators of health, and whether the 
units of observation are individuals
or groups” (p. 32).
3.3.2. Education and housing
We now regress an index of housing
conditions on schooling of the head
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5 There is also empirical evidence revealing higher rate of vaccinations among children of better educated 
parents (Haveman and Wolfe, 1984).
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of the household and income, gender 
of the head and urban-rural loca-
tion of the house. The Hausmann
test of endogeneity revealed that 
the variables schooling and income
of the household are not exogenous
(the same instruments were used 
as before). It is observed on table 5
that, using the proposed index and
the principal component analysis 
(PCA), although changes the values 
of the coeffi cient , does not affect the 
signifi cance or signs.
the higher is the educational level 
of the head. In addition, more edu-
cated people have a better access to
the credit market, which creates the 
possibility to improve the conditions
of the house. If we had information 
about permanent income, it is likely 
that this relationship between hous-
ing conditions and income would be 
more strongly perceived.
3.4. Vector of schooling returns
The returns to education of the head
of households by gender (w, m) and
for the poorest quintile (Q1) in Co-
lombia are:
αi = {αi1, αi2, αi3, αi4,}
αW  [   
]
 	 	 	 	
αM  [  
]
 	 	 	 	
α1W [   ]
 	 	 	 	
α1M  [ ∗∗	  ]
	 	 	 	
(∗∗) Non-signifi cant
Where the four elements of the set 
correspond to the schooling coeffi cient
for income, affi liation to the health
system, average health conditions of 
the family, and housing conditions
respectively.6
The coeffi cients for female heads are
higher than those for male heads in
the income equation, both for the
2SLS and for the lowest quintiles. 
6 Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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We fi nd that differences in housing
conditions are not only explained
by differences in income between
households, but also by the schooling 
level of the head. This separate effect
of schooling can be explained by the 
fact that better-educated people have 
more appropriate spending priorities 
than less -educated people: comparing 
households within the same income
range, housing conditions are better
%345$)/3'%2%.#)!,%3
This is a good signal of the great
benefi ts that educational policies - 
beyond basic education - directed to 
these groups would bring. As for the 
non-pecuniary returns, all coeffi cients
are lower for female heads except the
one corresponding to health condi-
tions. This is coherent with fi ndings 
of previous research, where the role
of the mother is identifi ed as having a
key role in determining lower mortal-
ity of children, higher possibilities of 
good nutrition of the family, higher 
rate of children vaccination, among 
other factors that will benefi t family’s 
health.
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Poverty and inequality are usually
thought as problems of multidimen-
sional nature. Likewise, returns to 
education should be analyzed as a 
multidimensional concept. In this 
empirical article we explore, using 
Colombian data, the benefi ts that 
schooling level of the head of the
household brings to three poverty
dimensions, namely, income, health 
and housing conditions.
When estimating the monetary re-
turns, we use an instrumental vari-
able quantile regression technique 
(IVQR). This is a very helpful method
especially when one is interested 
in distinguishing the effects of an 
explanatory variable for the lowest 
or highest tails in the distribution 
function of the dependent variable. In 
fact, our estimates confi rm the sus-
pected heterogeneity of the income
effect of education across quantiles 
of the conditional household-income
distribution: the coeffi cient for the
lowest quintile doubles the coeffi cient 
for the highest quintile.
These results suggest that people from
the poorest groups profi t more from 
each additional year of schooling than 
those belonging to the right extreme 
of income distribution. We may sug-
gest that there are certain factors that
increase with the income quintile such
as quality of social networks, more
favorable family environment, motiva-
tion, among others. This means that,
at a given schooling level, richer people
have more chances to get better jobs
than poorer people, due to wider con-
nections and more people belonging to 
their social network that occupy high
quality jobs. These factors cause that
people from higher quantiles obtain 
higher earnings independently of their
schooling level, while the marginal 
benefi t of educational investment for 
the poorest is greater.
We also made the estimations of 
monetary returns by gender of the 
head and urban-rural location of the 
household. We found that, for the
extreme quantiles, the schooling co-
effi cient corresponding to women at 
rural areas is the highest compared 
to the coeffi cient of any other group. 
This result for poor rural female 
household heads may have impor-
tant implications when designing 
rural educational policies, especially
considering that the education of 
the mother is more important than 
education of the father in determin-
ing children schooling achievements, 
as well as health conditions of the 
family. Educating women head of 
households at rural areas brings high
returns, both private and social.
As for the non-monetary returns, we 
found that education of the head is 
signifi cant to explain the affi liation of 
the family members to the health sys-
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tem, the average health conditions of 
individuals and the housing conditions.
The incidence of schooling on poverty 
goes far beyond the income effects:
higher knowledge may favorably shape
individuals behaviour and infl uence 
their decisions, which will be of advan-
tage to improve quality of life measured 
as satisfaction of basic needs.
We can surely continue improving
the techniques to estimate returns to
education, but what is most important 
is to keep exploring these returns as 
a concept of multidimensional nature.
It is also relevant to think about the
policy implications of recognizing the 
fundamental role of the heads’ educa-
tion level in shaping the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household they
lead. In this sense, there are at least
three spaces of action: the fi rst one 
is directly preventing young parent-
hood, which might be an obstacle for
the head to reach high educational 
achievements. A second one is widen-
ing the coverage and quality of educa-
tion for adults. A third action is related 
to fi nd mechanisms to counterweight 
the infl uence of parents low education
on children´s outcomes, especially by
separating the opportunity to reach
high educational achievements from
the family income level.
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